At the 20th Olympic Games held in Munich, Germany, in 1972, Palestinian members of the terrorist group “Black September” murdered 11 Israeli athletes. The shocking affair was broadcast globally on television.
Israeli Prime Minister Gol- da Meir vowed that those responsible would be tracked down and justice would be exacted. But as the plan unfolded, the list of targets expanded to include other suspected terrorists, as well. The particulars are outlined in “Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel’s Deadly Response,” by Aaron J. Klein (Random House, 256 pp, © 2005). Perhaps you’ve seen the Steven Spielberg film, “Munich,” which tells the story based on the 1984 book “Vengeance,” by George Jonas. “Striking Back” was written two decades later and has some fascinating details never before revealed.
For example, the head of Israel’s 27-member Olympic delegation expressed deep reservations about the insecure ground-floor location of the Israeli dorms in Munich’s Olympic Village. But his concerns were dismissed. No armed guards or police were positioned in the Olympic Village or at stadium entrances because Germany, just 27 years removed from the cataclysm of World War II, “didn’t want the world to see them holding guns...” The perimeter fence added little security; many Olympians – and the Palestinian assassins – “hopped it with ease,” Klein reports.
A Palestinian couple was stopped at German customs and the man was asked to open his bags. He complained bitterly, but eventually relented and asked the customs officer which bag he should open. The officer picked one; it contained lingerie. The officer waved the couple through without opening their other three pieces of luggage – which contained eight machine guns, magazines loaded with bullets, and 10 grenades, Klein relates. Black September’s unofficial leader later penned a book in which he wrote that one of the reasons he chose the Munich Games as the target for the terror attack of Sept. 5-6, 1972, was to secure the release of 234 “Palestinian fighters locked in Israeli jails.”
Golda Meir, though, refused to “bow to extortion.” Instead, the Israelis handed off the issue of negotiations to the West Germans. However, the Germans – who had a reputation for efficiency and precision – botched the operation. Negotiations were futile. West Germany had decided “the captors could not be allowed to leave the country with the hostages.” When the Germans went on the offensive, the Palestinians reacted by slaughtering their hostages. Five of the terrorists were killed, too, but the Palestinians “were willing to become martyrs; in fact, it was an integral part of their plan,” Klein says. Three of the Palestinians were captured, but the West Germans released them the next month in a hostage exchange, and the trio settled in Libya.
Because of the Munich massacre, the Israeli government developed a plan to fight Palestinian terrorism. Not only would Israel exact revenge for Munich, but it also would take “preventive” measures: eliminating “terror operatives who harbored malevolent intentions” toward Israel and its citizens.” It also was hoped that “a withering series of assassinations would deter” terrorists; they’d be too busy looking over their shoulders to engage in nefarious skullduggery. Assassination became “a major tool in counter-terrorism,” Klein relates. The first victim was a Palestinian who was the head of Black September in Rome and was suspected of aiding and abetting the Munich attack; he was shot to death in the entryway to an apartment complex. Three months after Munich the PLO’s “unofficial man” in Paris was fatally injured by an explosive device planted in the telephone in his apartment. One target was poisoned and died a miserable death over a period of several months in an East German hospital.
Three targeted men were killed in Beirut, Lebanon, where the terrorists “felt relatively safe” because it had become “a mecca of sorts for mostly left-wing international terror organizations,” Klein writes. Many other targets of Israel’s wrath also were dispatched, but not all of them. A plan was developed to kill Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, but an Israeli official nixed the plan.
“It’s a double-edged sword,” he said. “Today we kill their leaders and tomorrow they kill ours. It goes on forever. I won’t authorize it.” Less than two months after Munich, a Palestinian in transit at Amsterdam’s airport was stopped with 40 pounds of explosives, 21 letter bombs, and a stash of grenades, detonators, and pistols. The contraband was surrendered by the traveler, but he was released several hours later and allowed to continue on his way.
Despite the Munich massacre, western Europe remained remarkably apathetic about terrorism. A survey conducted by the Israeli Foreign Ministry found that 204 men were convicted of terrorist-related felonies in countries outside the Middle East between 1968 and 1975; yet by late 1975 only three remained behind bars, Klein writes.